In order to examine whether Chinese employers discriminated against females during the hiring process in 1996 and 2005, we used the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) questionnaire (1997 data, pooled data of 2004 and 2006) by referring to Johnson (1983) and Mohanty (1998) . Empirical results of the 1996 sample reveal that male workers generally receive less favorable treatment and consequently enjoy a lower average employment probability than female workers. However, approximately a decade after the enactment of the labor law, the 2005 sample shows that male workers generally enjoy preferential treatment over female workers with otherwise identical worker characteristics. Our empirical results suggest that an increase in the education level of females, in the employment probability of females aged 25 and younger, and in the employment probability of females working in the government sector may prove effective in eliminating employment discrimination between males and females.
Introduction
A woman is afforded equal rights with a man in employment. … (Labour Law 1 , 1994, Article 13)
After 1949, the Chinese government adopted a bureaucratic system of administering wages and allocating labor. Since 1957, the state exercised a virtual monopoly over the allocation of urban labor. It was the plan, and not labor market, that governed labor supply and demand. The labor "requirements" of each enterprise were based on the plan, which was adjusted to avoid urban unemployment. Reform of the urban labor system began in 1980, when the state monopoly of labor allocation was replaced by a fairly more decentralized one. Labor exchanges were set up for the registration of job vacancies, most job placements, and training. In the 1990s, the planning quota for recruitment by state enterprises was abolished, and enterprises were allowed to choose their own employees. The state no longer took responsibility for matching the supply of and demand for labor. In principle, this should have made the labor market more flexible. Moreover, the government decided to steer state enterprises into the market, holding them responsible for their losses even to the point of bankruptcy. Until 1995, the state sector was still dominant, and a combination of retraining and attrition managed to keep open unemployment low. 2 State enterprise reform gained momentum in the mid-1990s, and major surplus labors were ostracized from state and collective enterprises. Labor supply exceeded labor demand in the labor market (Wu and Li, 2006) . As shown in Figure 1 , in 1994, the total employment, male employment, and female employment in urban units were 152,585,000, 94,594,000, and 57,991,000 persons, respectively. However, in 2005, these figures dropped to 114,040,000, 70,794,000, and 43,246,000 persons, respectively. The share of female employment is maintained by an approximate 38%. One of the reasons that the share of female employment is lesser than that of male employment is that labor force participation of females is lower than that of males (Cai et al., 2005) . Another probable reason could be related to employee demand, that is, employers could discriminate against females during recruitment. According to the China Employment Discrimination Survey Questionnaire Report, 3 85.5% responded "yes," when asked "Is there employment discrimination in current labor market?" Moreover, 50.8% responded "very serious" to the same question. On the other hand, while it was inquired "whether or not the enterprise or employer put forward gender-based employment restrictions," respondents said that 13.9% of the cases specified "males only," while 7.1% of the cases specified "females only." However, a detailed and more precise analysis of employment discrimination among males and females 1 The labor law was promulgated in 1994 and put into effect in 1995. 2 The details reported in this paragraph draw on various sources, primarily, Shirk (1981) , White (1988) , and Knight and Song (2003) . 3 The survey was conducted by the China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) in 2006; it included 3,454 questionnaires and covered 10 cities, namely, Beijing, Guangzhou, Nanjing, Wuhan, Shenyang, Sian, Chengdu, Zhengzhou, Yinchuan, and Qingdao.
Source: http://www.eeo.com.cn/eeo/jjgcb/2007/07/02/73823.html in the Chinese labor market is required. An employer can discriminate against a worker at various stages of employment, for instance, during the hiring process, in the payment of wages, with regard to promotion, etc. Wage discrimination refers to a difference in the earnings of two identical workers. Several studies have demonstrated gender discrimination in the payment of wages (Oaxaca, 1973; Blau and Beller, 1988; Olian et al., 1988; Gill, 1989; Hersch, 1991) .
Employment discrimination refers to disparities in employment probabilities resulting from the prejudices of employers. If an employer is prejudiced against non-whites, for example, then non-white workers are less likely to be hired than otherwise identical white workers (Abowd and Killingsworth, 1984) . When differences in employment probabilities between two groups of workers cannot be explained by observable characteristics, there may be employment discrimination in the labor market. Several studies have examined the presence of employment discrimination in the US labor market, using unexplained employment probability differential as an indicator (Johnson, 1983; Abowd and Killingsworth, 1984; Mohanty, 1998 Mohanty, , 2000 .
Several studies have analyzed gender wage differential and discrimination in the Chinese labor market (Liu et al., 2000; Mason et al., 2000; Meng, 1998) . Others have analyzed wage discrimination between urban residents and rural migrants in China (Meng and Zhang, 2001; Wang and Zuo, 1999; Zhao, 2000) . To our knowledge, however, there have been no earlier analyses of employment discrimination among males and females in the Chinese labor market.
This study focuses on hiring discrimination. The next section introduces the procedures used for our estimations. Section 3 presents the data and the definitions of variables, while section 4 presents the empirical results. The final section offers concluding remarks.
Empirical Techniques
In this section, we briefly summarize the procedure for estimating the worker's employment probability by referring to Johnson (1983) and Mohanty (1998) . Let denote the employer's preference for the t y t-th worker, and let be a set of variables describing the worker's characteristics and the aggregate employment situation in the labor market. Then, we have the following relationship:
where β is a vector of unknown coefficients, and is the error term. It is assumed that the error term has a standard normal distribution. we have
Then, we can rewrite the employment probability in equation (2) as follows:
where denotes the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution （Cameron and Trivedi, 2005）. We estimate the vector of unknown parameters Φ β using the maximum likelihood method. Let be the worker's employment probability in the presence of discrimination, and let be the worker's employment probability in the absence of discrimination. Thus, we define the indicator of employment discrimination (D) as follows:
Equation (5) shows the unexplained differential between the probability with discrimination and the probability without discrimination. Using the residual difference approach given by Oaxaca (1973) and Johnson (1983) , we obtain two alternative indicators of employment discrimination based on two different no-discrimination coefficient vectors as follows:
where Φ denotes the average employment probability of all workers in the sample. In equations (6) and (7), the superscripts M and denote male workers and female workers, respectively. Equation (6) indicates that D F 1 measures the unexplained differences in male and female employment rates, when are used as no-discrimination coefficients. Equation (7) 
Data
This paper uses the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) 6 questionnaire data (1997, 2004 and 2006 7 ) to examine whether Chinese employers discriminate against females during the hiring process. The year 1996 was the next year that the labor law was put in force, and state enterprise reform gained momentum. On the other hand, around a decade later, the labor supply exceeded labor demand in the labor market, and China jointed the WTO. Through our study, we wish to find out whether Chinese employers discriminated against females during the hiring process in the year 2005. In the 1997 CHNS, questionnaires were distributed in the provinces of Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, Guizhou, Guangxi, Hubei, Henan, and Hunan (16 cities with 128 neighborhoods, and 32 counties with 256 villages); whereas, in the CHNS of 2004 and 2006, nine provinces were included, and Liaoning was superadded (18 cities with 216 neighborhoods, and 36 counties with 432 villages). However, the data used in this paper are taken from the urban household data only.
In order to examine the problem of employment discrimination among males and females, we drew samples that comprised only employed workers and unemployed workers, who were actively seeking employment. In accordance with the standard practice, we excluded employers, self-employed individuals, retirees, students, and household workers from the analysis. We also excluded all persons aged 15 or younger (China's labor law sets the minimum working age as 16), as well as respondents who provided incomplete individual information or household composition. After the exclusions, the 1996 sample comprised 1,287 employed workers (697 men and 590 women) and 94 unemployed workers actively seeking employment (55 men and 39 women). On the other hand, the 2003 and 2005 sample comprised 2,422 employed workers (1,419 men and 1,003 women) and 460 unemployed workers actively seeking employment (253 men and 207 women), between the ages of 16 (the school leaving age) and 55 (state retirement age for women) or 60 (state retirement age for men).
The explanatory variables used in the hiring equations include those related to the worker's human capital characteristics (such as years of schooling completed, GRADE 8 ; experience, EXP; age, YOUNG; and marital status, MARRIED) and family income (FAMINC) as well as other variables (such as region of residence, EAST; and location of residence, CNTRCITY). As shown in Figure 1 , the employment percentage in the government sector and the employment percentage in the service sector in urban units decrease and increase, respectively. That is, the two variables that represent the macro-economical situation may influence the employer's hiring decision as well as the yearly unemployment rate. Consequently, the province employment percentage in the government sector (GOVPCT), the province employment percentage in the service sector (SERVPCT), and the city registration unemployment rate of each province (URATE) We have provided the definitions, means, and standard deviations of these variables in Tables 1 and 2 .
Empirical Results
Table 3 presents the parameter estimates of employment probability equations for the male and female workers, based on the 1996 sample and the 2003 and 2005 pooled sample. The average employment probabilities (presented in Table 4 ) are obtained on computing individual probabilities for all workers in the sample by the use of relevant variables and coefficients.
The estimated average male and female employment probabilities are provided in the first two columns of Table 4 . The average employment probability of male workers can be obtained (presented in column iii) using coefficients obtained from the hiring equations obtained from the female sample. When using coefficients obtained from hiring equations obtained from the male sample, the average employment probability of female workers are shown in column iv.
is smaller than that of column iii , it indicates an increase in the employment probability of males, by using the coefficients obtained from the hiring equation of the 1996 female sample. Similarly, when the value of column ii is larger than that of column iv , it indicates a decrease in the employment probability of females, by using the coefficients obtained
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from the hiring equation of the 1996 male sample. The male employment probability increases by about 2.2% when male workers are treated in a manner similar to that of female workers. Conversely, the employment probability of female workers decreases by about 1.8% when the female workers are treated in a manner similar to that of male workers.
However, the results are converse in the 2005 sample. When the value of column i is larger than that of column iii , it indicates a decrease in the employment probability of males, by using the coefficients obtained from the hiring equation of the 2005 female sample. Similarly, when the value of column ii is smaller than that of column iv , it indicates an increase in the employment probability of females, by using the coefficients obtained from the hiring equation of the 2005 male sample. The male employment probability decreases by about 3.2% when male workers are treated in a manner similar to that of female workers. Conversely, the employment probability of female workers increases by about 4.0% when the female workers are treated in a manner similar to that of male workers.
When both and , defined in equations (5) and (6), have the same sign with statistical significance, employment discrimination may be present in the labor market. 
D
A positive and significant denotes that male workers benefit from favoritism when the coefficient vector of females, , is considered discrimination-free. Since in the first column of Table 5 is around -0.02 and significant, this result indicates that male workers generally receive less favorable treatment and consequently enjoy a lower average employment probability (in other words, they suffer from higher unemployment) than they would if they were treated in a manner similar to that of female workers in the 1996 sample. However, the converse result, in which in the third column of Table 5 is around 0.03 and significant, shows that male workers generally enjoy preferential treatment over female workers with otherwise identical worker characteristics in the 2005 sample. Similarly, a positive and significant suggests that the employers have a prejudice against female workers when the coefficient vector of males, , is considered discrimination-free. Since in the second column of Table 5 is around -0.02 and significant, this result indicates that female workers generally receive higher favorable treatment and consequently enjoy a higher average employment probability than they would if they were treated in a manner similar to that of male workers in the 1996 sample. On the other hand, the converse result, in which in the fourth column of Table 5 is about 0.04 and significant, suggests that female workers generally receive less favorable treatment and consequently enjoy a lower average employment probability (in other words, they suffer from higher unemployment) than they would if they were treated in a manner similar to that of male workers in the 2005 sample.
In order to explain how the employment probabilities of male and female workers change in response to changes in relevant independent variables, we will use the partial derivatives of the employment probability as the relevant independent variables (presented in Table 6 ).
The positive impact of GRADE on the worker's employment probability in all samples indicates the employer's preference for workers having a higher education level. As shown in Table 6 , if the education level increases by one year, the employment probability of males increases by about 3.0%; however, the employment probability of females was slightly higher (3.7%) in 2005. The employment probability of females aged 25 and younger, with other variables held constant, was 8.2 % lower than other females in 2005. The impact of GOVPCT is positive for females on the 1996 sample and for males on the 2005 sample; however, this impact is negative for females on the 2005 sample. Consequently, steps taken with regard to increasing the education level of females, implementing policies for increasing the employment probability of females aged 25 and younger, and increasing the employment probability of females in the government sector 9 may reduce the employment probability gap between females and males. Johnson (1983) and Mohanty (1998) demonstrated that the gap between female and male unemployment rates has disappeared in the United States. Mohanty (1998) explained that although the reason for such a change in employers' attitudes towards females is not clear, it may partly be attributed to the implementation of the Civil Rights Act in the 1960s and 1970s. According to the above explanation, this Act will play an important role in reducing employment probability difference between females and males, by strengthening the effectiveness of the labor law and constituting expert anti-discrimination law in China.
Some Concluding Remarks
By referring to Johnson (1983) and Mohanty (1998) , we empirically analyzed whether employers discriminated between males and females when hiring employees in 1996-the year after the labor law was passed and when state enterprise reform gained momentum-and in 2005, a decade after the enactment of the labor law. Empirical results reveal the prevalence of hiring discrimination between male and female workers both in 1996 and in 2005. However, the 1996 sample suggests that male workers generally receive less favorable treatment and consequently enjoy a lower average employment probability than female workers; whereas, the 2005 sample reveals that male workers generally enjoy preferential treatment over female workers with otherwise identical worker characteristics. Then, we suggested that an increase in the education level of females, in the employment probability of females aged 25 and younger, and in the employment probability of females in the government sector may prove effective in eliminating employment discrimination between males and females. * shows that variables are significant at a 10 percent level. ** shows that variables are significant at a 5 percent level. *** shows that variables are significant at a 1 percent level. 
